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The Meditations of Descartes have a property almost unique to them
which I will call during the course of this paper "linear subjectivity." Lin
ear subjectivity is the manifestation of any argument that is presented as
purely a work of its author, drawn only from the perceptions and resources
of that author (hence subjective), whose strength lies not in collaboration
with the reasonings of others or in the use of empirical supporting evi
dence, but rather in the author's careful, rational, linear progression from
one of his ideas to the next throughout the course of the argument. It is this
strategy, both subjective and linear, which Descartes employs throughout
his Meditations, and in this paper it is my intention to show that there is a
crucial place in the third Meditation, most notably, in which Descartes'
otherwise largely successful use of this linear subjectivity suddenly and
tragically breaks down, the point at which Descartes fails to convince
argumentatively that it was God who put the idea of God in him, and that
he did not create the concept himself.
Before the crucial place of breakdown can be sufficientlyappreciated,
however, it is necessary to acknowledge the special problems that linear
subjectivity presents for Descartes—problems that do not trouble other,
comparableworks—butat the sametime acknowledgethat for a fair amount
of the third Meditation linear subjectivity does allow Descartes to pursue
the foundation of trustworthy reasoning he was seeking. The breakdown of
the third Meditation therefore is not inherently in the style of argument, but
rather in what seems to be Descartes' eventual misapplication of it. If we
begin our examination of linear subjectivity by noting how its absence af
fects comparable philosophical works, we may immediately get a sense of
both its advantages and disadvantages for Descartes when he uses it as a
central part of the Meditations, especially the third Meditation.
Most philosophical ideas are advanced in mediares, in the middle of a
line of inquiry. Before the newest treatment of a philosophical idea is pro
posed, its author pays tribute to some treatment (or treatments) presented
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prior to his own, often actively drawing his own contribution out of the
previous work on the ideaperformed by otherthinkers, the tenets of that
previous work becoming axiomatic in his new treatment. Socrates, in one
instance typical of his style of argument, assumes that some Equal exists
before he actually begins a discussion involving equals, and likewise he
assumes that equal objects strive to be like this Equal but fail >; Nietzsche
borrows atthe very least the scope and truth-seeking style of Zoroaster in
Thus Spake Zarathrustra, presenting truth asa series of revelations whose
original source hedoes not define orexplain2; Spinoza3 and Sartre4 build
from the foundations of Descartes; Kant, even in his Groundwork ofthe
Metaphysic ofMorals*, is subjective but not linear in style, not concerning
himself with defining or explaining certain basic concepts of truth pro
vided byhis intellect^ All of these philosophers, then, avoid linear subjec
tivity in the instances noted, avoiding in some way foundational proofs of
their reasonings.
There are three major advantages in beginning an argument as they
do, with aset of axioms: First, each of their new treatments cannot really
be evaluated unless their readers enter immediately into an agreement that
the pre-conceived axioms which their works rely upon are true. Because of
this necessary initial agreement, the author and reader are already on
argumentatively friendly terms. Without this agreement, the reader cannot
possibly evaluate the new argument, based as it is—or so she would be
lieve—on false premises.7
1Phaedo, Pliaedo, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977) sect. B.
2Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathrustra (New York: Viking Press, 1954).
3Benedictus de Spinoza, The Principles ofPhilosophy Demonstrated In The Geometric
Manner, ed. and trans. Edward Curley (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985) sect. I pp. 141-164.
4Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism andHuman Emotions (New York: Carol Publishing 1990)
p. 9.
5Immanuel Kant, Groundwork ofthe Metaphysic ofMorals, ed. and trans. H.J. Paton (New
York: Harper and Row, 1956).
6It is true that Kant begins the Groundwork (the work which illustrates several basic prin
ciples ofmetaphysics Kant uses during later works) with his own subjective stance, but he
only presents his arguments after having organized his ideas into categories following his
consideration of them, rather than showing step bystep, idea toidea, how hehasarrived at
the principles upon which his arguments have been based. His argument isnot presented in
a linear fashion, then,and this protects it from the fundamental scrutiny towhich Descartes
is subjected.
7Much as itis impossible to determine the relationship between two triangles in geometry
without accepting certain principles ofgeometry, such as the definition ofsimilarity be
tween triangles: 'Two triangles which have three angles ofone triangle equal respectively
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Second, if the readerdoes perceive something to be incorrectabout the
argument, it is possible that the onus is the original thinker's—having pro
vided, as it were, false foundations for the work of the new author. It is
possible that the fault lies with the new author's interpretation of the origi
nal thinker's rudimentary principles, but in any case, the new author is
protected, perhaps even completely, from a fundamental criticism of his
work.
Third, authors who rely in part on another thinker's work avoid the
infinitely more difficult task of proving the foundations upon which their
arguments are based. By using derivatives of difficult-to-demonstrate fun
damental principles, such as derivatives like theorems, corrolaries, or lem
mas, or any other tools provided by the science of logic, the majority of
philosophical authors essentially deal with the results ofLogic,8 rather than
defining or understanding (at the most basic level) what Logic is in itself.
Logic is scrutable, it seems, only unto a certain point: All causal statements
depend on the truth of the "if statement, for instance, the truth or falsity of
the logical statement seems readily apparent to those who have understood
its principles. Determining the truth of the "if statement is more difficult
than determining the truth or falsity of the logical statement, as the estab
lishment of whether or not there is truth in a statement inevitably depends
on a wider rangeofexperiences, such as experiences with vocabulary words,
spatial perceptions, the behavior and appearance of external objects, etc.
Determining the specific rational basis of the truth statement itself—a
determination which would rest on experiences even less easy to catego
rize and understand than the relatively concrete world experiences just
mentioned—is more difficult still. The experience which allows us to evalu
ate these constructs is undoubtedly the most inscrutable of experiences,
since the Logic which allows for the constructs does not seem to be gath
ered by direct experience of the outside world but seems to be present in
nately somehow; we seem to "know," as Descartes states it, that logical
statements and all other things we believe to be true must be true because
we have perceived, with the very best of our perceptions, that they are
"clearly and distinctly" true.9The studying ofthe foundations of these things,
to the three angles of the other triangle and the ratios between the measures of the corre
sponding sides all equal are said to be similar."
8Here,theterm"Logic"specifically refers to thesetof internal principles whichwe useto
make our world intelligible.
9Rend Descartes, Meditations onFirst Philosophy In Which The Existence ofGodAndThe
Distinction of the Soul from the Body Are Deomonstrated, trans. Donald A. Cress (India
napolis: Hackett, 1979) p. 35.
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the foundations of the things whichwe usuallyassume we "know," is a far
more difficult task than using those obscure, perhaps unknowable founda
tions of reason as a background for clearer, unquestionably rational arenas
like symbolic logic,simply because thesearenas are easier to speakabout
and demonstrate. If we ask aboutthe basis upon which theseprinciples of
logicrest,however, wefindourselves as Descartes does,beingaskedrather
to scrutinize the minds with which we scrutinize, and to struggle in an
attempt to connect ourselves with, if not peer into, the mind of God.
Allof thishasbearing onDescartes' Meditations, mostdisastrously in
the third, for we find thatby not beginning his arguments withcertainaxi
oms or a set of pre-determined principles as givens, he has stripped his
argument ofa lotofarmor which would normally have protected it through
outthecourse of hisreasoning; hehasforfeited theadvantages which most
other philosophers accept, giving up the benefits of initial reader agree
ment, extended onus, and protection from the necessity of a fundamental
proof. Instead, Descartes places his trust exclusively in linear subjectivity,
believing that this strategy will not leave him prostrate in the argumenta
tive battlefield, but will rather allow him to reach a fundamental state of
doubt from which hemay determine, absolutely, what it is hecanknow for
certain.
Unfortunately, Descartes begins his argument with a sizeable uncer
tainty. This uncertainty is rooted in an entity he refers to as "the natural
light" or"thelight ofreason." Descartes did not feel there was any unclarity
contained in his conceptionof the light of reason, and in a certain mode of
thinking, he was right. It is true he has a "clear and distinct" idea of the
light of reason in thesense that herecognized it asanentity separate from
other things—specifically, he felt it was the entity which allows each hu
man being to discover truth, andallows him or her to behave rationally in
accordance with that knowledge. The light of reason is this special thing,
according toDescartes. However, in terms of theambitious planshe has in
thethirdMeditation, hisconsideration of thelightof reason is nevertheless
insufficient. If Descartes had merely referred to the light of reason as a
distinct entity, no trouble would have visited his argument. Instead, how
ever, he tries to extrapolate from his definition without having any solid
knowledge of the thing he's defined. Specifically, he asserts that the light
of reason (or the mind's faculties) contains no element of the body, even
though he does not know whatdoescomprise the mind.
He believes that he knows what the light of reason is because he knows
what it isnot,butthis isapeculiar logic thatseems suspect: it is theequiva-
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lent of Descartes' pointing to a random man in a crowd and saying he
knows this man, simply because he can distinguish this man from a cow, a
cart, or a sheep.
Descartes' knowledge of the light of reason is scant, especially from a
factual, scientific standpoint, but he claimsthat an"adequate" knowledge
of suchathingis notrequired; inObjections andReplieshe saysit is enough
"for our knowledge to have sufficient adequacy to let us see that we have
not rendered it inadequate by intellectual abstraction."'0 Yet, since he has
no facts about the light of reason, he must depend on intellectual abstrac
tion alone to give it its properties: "I understand that mind is something
completc.although I deny that anything belongs to it which is contained
in the idea of the body. But this could not be unless there were a real dis
tinction between mind and body."11 But, nevertheless, the mind and the
body seem to always exist in conjunction, or at least they normally coexist.
Rather than allowing for the fact that the intermingling of the mind and
body is a phenomenon that is not completely understood, a phenomenon
which may involve the mind's dependence on the body for its construction
and/or sustenance,12 Descartes gradually cleaves them in two—out of his
belief that he had sufficient grasp of their natures to do so. (Linear subjec
tivity would not allow for any ambiguous element to appear in his argu
ment, so Descartes is involved in a conundrum: either he may choose not
to deal with the unknown parts of the light of reason and keep his argument
on its linear path, or he may choose to admit the ambiguity of what he
knows and ruin the confidence and clarity of his argument. Due to his lin
ear subjective strategy, he chooses the former.) To justify this cleavage,
Descartes says in his Reply to Objection VI that "many things are appre
hended as a unity, which after a more careful scrutiny shows to be dis
tinct,"'3 and although this observation may be true, there is no reason for
him to assume that it applies in the case of the mind and the body.
Descartes makes a great faulty assumption that his knowledge of the
light of reason is sufficient for him to proceed reliably in his argument
10 Rene" Descartes, "Reply to Objections IV," The Philosophical Works ofDescartes inTwo
Volumes: VolumeII, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (United States: Dover,
1934) p. 98.
1' Ibid; Replyto Objections I, p. 23.
12 This very hypothesis is currently being proposed by Antonio Damasio in his book,
Descartes' Error, (New York: Tutnam, 1994).
13 Major Philosophical Works, p. 257.











